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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper systematically investigates the safety of fuel preparation room containing high 
pressure fuel gas supply systems in order to identify shortcomings and practical gaps of the 
current regulations. A very large ore carrier of 300,000 DWT was taken as an example and 
the LNG fuel system was designed for it. An event tree analysis was conducted on the fuel 
system to identify events that can lead to an explosion. Along with a fault tree analysis 
model, generic failure data from various sources were used to estimate frequency of 
potential explosion. For the consequence analysis computational fluid dynamics and finite 
element analysis software were used to estimate the impact of explosions on the boundary 
structure of the fuel preparation room. Research findings show that the current rules and 
regulations concerning the safety of fuel preparation rooms and that the high pressure fuel 
gas supply system is subject to an unacceptably high level of explosion risk with the 
frequency of explosion as high as 3.13E-04 per year. The impact of an explosion within the 
fuel preparation rooms can cause stresses in excess of allowable stress in the bottom 
structure if not being strengthened. It is proposed that special attention is given to the 
structural design and/or enhanced safe measures for the FPRs and the relevant regulations 
updated to account for this. 
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List of symbols 
O           Failure rate / year 
T           Period of time (in year) 
QLR              Leak rate (kg/s) 
UL           LNG density (kg/m3) 
AL          Cross-sectional area of leak (m2) 
CL           Discharge coefficient used for liquid (= 0.61) 
J            Specific heat ratio (= 1.31) 
Ps           Absolute pressure inside pipe (Pa) 
Pa           Atmospheric pressure (Pa) 
M           Molecular weight (kg/kmol) 
Ts           Storage temperature (K) 
R            Universal gas constant (= 8,314) (J/kmol K) 
CG            Discharge coefficient used for gas (= 0.84) 
PDI           Probability of delayed ignition 
t  Concerned year(= 1 year) 
 
 
List of acronyms 
BOG  boil-off gas  
CCC  Carriage of Cargoes and Containers  
ETA  event tree analysis  
FGSSs  fuel gas supply systems 
FSA  Formal Safety Assessment  
FPR  fuel preparation room  
HPL  high pressure liquid  
HPV  high pressure vapour 
IGF Code International Code of Safety for Ships using Gases or Other Low-flashpoint fuels 
KR  Korean Register  
LEL  low explosive level  
LPL  low pressure liquid  
LPV  low pressure vapour  
VLOCs  very large ore carriers  
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1. Introduction 
With the world-wide green shipping movement and consequent introduction of more 
stringent regulations on engine exhaust emissions, the use of LNG as a marine fuel has 
become an immediate prospect. Technical advancement in gas engines has also helped in 
the advent of LNG-fuelled ships (Aymelek et al, 2015). According to a survey on global 
new-build forecasts, the number of LNG-fuelled ships is anticipated to reach up to 700, 
accounting for approximately 4.2 % of global newly built ships by 2025 (Lloyd's Register, 
2012). 
Meanwhile, all ocean-going LNG-fuelled ships having gross tonnage of 500 and above are 
subjected to International Code of Safety for Ships using Gases or other Low-flashpoint 
Fuels (IGF Code), which requires the impact of any explosion to be confined to the 
originating area only, not allowing it to cause disruption of the proper functioning of 
systems located in other spaces (IMO, 2017). Fuel gas supply systems (FGSSs) with high 
operating pressure of up to 300 bars have aroused the safety concerns for LNG-fuelled 
ships (Republic of Korea, 2014; DNV GL, 2014). Nevertheless, the IGF Code, and other 
related rules and standards have not been able to provide any sufficiently detailed 
guidelines on designing and arranging the fuel preparation room (FPR) containing high 
pressure FGSS. 
The first ocean-going LNG-fuelled container ship entered service in late 2015. The FPR of 
this ship is arranged on open deck between two LNG fuel storage tanks (Piellisch, 2013). 
It is conceivable that any explosion occurring in the FPR can damage the storage tanks and 
this can lead to a much more serious accident. However, under the current regulations, it 
appears at least that the boundary structure of the FPR is not specially strengthened in any 
way. 
On larger LNG-fuelled ships, such as very large ore carriers (VLOCs) or container ships 
over 10,000 TEU it may be necessary to arrange the fuel systems below the freeboard deck, 
because not only are those too big to be placed on an open deck but also they may be in the 
way of cargo operation. In this case, an explosion in the FPR can cause more serious 
damages on the structures around it. 
As for the LNG explosion, Filippo (Gavelli, et al., 2011) investigated the impact of vapour 
cloud explosion during LNG cargo transfer with LNG carriers. Dan (Dan et al., 2014) 
conducted a risk analysis for LNG-FPSO topside systems. Given the importance on the 
safety of LNG-fuelled systems, it is not surprising that a variety of studies on the risk of 
using LNG as a marine fuel have been reported (Germany and Norway, 2012; ADN 
Administrative Committee, 2014; ABS, 2014). IMO¶V 6XE-committee on Carriage of 
Cargoes and Containers (CCC) (Republic of Korea, 2014) examined the potential risk of 
explosion in an FPR containing a high pressure FGSS, and presented the result of computer 
simulation studies that shows a deterministic impact of an instantaneous explosion with 
massive concentration of LNG vapour gas, using a CFD code FLACS1. Lee (Lee et al., 
2015) compared the LNG fire risk of two different types of low pressure FGSS with 
working pressure of 10 bars. 
Despite the requirement of IGF Code, the work exemplified above are mostly limited to 
the provisions of general guidelines of LNG explosions, and the safety of FPRs with high 
pressure FGSSs have not been systematically addressed. 
                                                          
1 Flame Acceleration simulator (FLACS), Ver. 10.0, GexCon, Bergen, Norway   
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To summarize, due largely to the brevity of its history, the existing regulations, class rules, 
guidelines and standards appear to have some limitations and gaps. The current regulations 
do not explicitly state safety requirements of high pressure FGSSs for LNG fuelled ships, 
and there has been no published work on this issue so far. This was why it was decided to 
investigate the potential risk levels of explosion in FPRs by means of systematic 
quantitative risk assessment. It is hoped that the knowledge gained through this study will 
be able to contribute to enhancing the regulations on designing and arranging FPRs. 
 
2. Research Methods Used 
In this study the risk levels of FPRs with high pressure FGSSs were investigated. For this 
work a procedure was devised consisting of four steps EDVHGRQWKH,02¶VJXLGHOLQHVIRU
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) (IMO, 2002): accident scenario analysis, frequency 
analysis, consequence analysis and risk assessment. A flowchart representing the process 
is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
2.1  Scenario Analysis 
In the event of a flammable gas developing a leak, an ignition may occur, leading to one of 
several types of fire. If, on the other hand, the ignition is delayed until after the gas disperses 
and forms a flammable vapour cloud, then an explosion may occur depending on the level 
of concentration of the flammable gas (ISO, 2015). Bearing in mind that there are several 
scenarios and events leading to an explosion, an event tree analysis (ETA) was performed 
in order to identify all possible routes to explosion, taking into account of the safety systems 
normally fitted in FPRs. 
 
2.2  Frequency Analysis 
Frequency analysis is a process of quantifying the probability of unwanted events identified 
though the scenario analysis. In this step the frequency of initial leak from the FGSS and 
the probabilities of all possible sequences of events identified in the scenario analysis are 
estimated. It is to be noted that the current study addresses the risks due to internal events, 
and not the external events, such as collision or grounding. 
Since the history of LNG-fuelled ships is too short for any meaningful statistics to be 
compiled, this study relies upon appropriate generic data associated with LNG process 
equipment in offshore and chemical industries. It is inevitable, therefore, that there may be 
some uncertainties in the results of frequency in the quantitative sense. Nevertheless, this 
study highlighted the hierarchy of the risk contributor events (Kim et al., 2005). 
 
2.3  Consequence Analysis 
Consequence analysis consists of two parts: explosion analysis and structural analysis. In 
the explosion analysis the explosion is simulated using a CFD program and the magnitude 
of the consequent load on the FPR structure is determined, while in the structural analysis 
the effect of the load on the structure of the boundary wall of the FPR is assessed by means 
of an FEA software. 
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CH4 + 2(O2+3.79N2) Î CO2 +2H2O + 7.58N2 (1) 
 
The impact of explosion on structures is a function of the ratio of fuel/air mixture and the 
distance from the ignition point (Versteeg, 2007). However, since the location of the 
ignition point will be unpredictable and the ratio of fuel/air mixture is determined by 
various factors such as leak duration, the effectiveness of ventilation system and the time 
of ignition, it is hard to predict the properties of the explosion precisely. In this context a 
conservative model to investigate the worst-case will be safer than probabilistic models. 
Consequently, the explosion was modelled based on complete combustion of the ideal 
stoichiometric air/fuel ratio equivelent to 17.255 kg air for each kg of fuel (Versteeg, 2007).  
The ignition point was assumed to be 1.0 m above the floor. This height was selected so as 
to apply a higher explosion impact load on the floor sturcture (room height is 2.5 m). Since 
LNG is primarily methane (CH4) with a small mixture of other hydrocarbons, the 
composition of the liquid fuel was assumed to be pure methane and the complete 
combustion equation for this study is given in Eq. (1) (ISO, 2013; Versteeg, 2007). 
 
2.4  Risk Assessment 
Risk is defined as the product of the probability of occurrence of an accident and its 
consequence. The consequence is usually expressed in terms of lives lost and injuries 
caused or financial losses suffered. In the current case, however, there is no direct danger 
to lives, since the FPR and the areas around it are normally unmanned. The damage to 
property is difficult to quantify, as it will be case-specific. 
For these reasons, it was decided to examine the probability of occurrence of explosion as 
an item to be compared to the tolerable probability normally accepted by the industry. The 
consequence can also be examined by studying the stresses that the structure is likely to 
experience in the event of an explosion and comparing them to the allowable stresses of 
the material. 
 
3. A Case Study 
3.1  Case Ship and Design of the Fuel System 
In order to determine if there is any serious risk in LNG fuel systems a typical ocean-going 
cargo ship, a 300,000 DWT VLOC, was selected as a case ship for the study. This ship is 
the subject of µ/1*-Ready Ships2¶ D MRLQW project between Korean Register (KR) and 
Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. General specifications of the ship including operational 
profiles are summarised in Table 1.  
The main engine was to be modified to a dual fuel engine and the LNG fuel system was 
designed for this ship in outline in accordance with the IGF Code, class rules and other 
relevant guidelines in cooperation with KR. 
                                                          
2 Ships which can be easily retrofitted to use liquefied natural gas (LNG) bunkers. 
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It was agreed by all parties concerned that the best arrangement of the LNG fuel system 
was as represented in Fig. 2. The proposed concept involves transforming No.4 cargo hold 
into the space for LNG fuel systems, placing the LNG fuel storage tank (IMO Type B Tank), 
the tank connection space and the FPR inside the same hold (Korean Register, 2015). The 
ORDGEDODQFHRQWKHRYHUDOOVKLS¶VVWUXFWXUHDQGminimum interference to cargo operations 
were taken into consideration in the decision process. 7KH VKLS¶V RZQHU UHTXLUHG Whe 
capacity of the LNG fuel storage tank to be at least 10,000 m3. The fuel supply to the engine 
room is through double wall pipes lying on the freeboard deck. 
The FPR is 17 m long, 6 m wide and 2.5 m high. Originally the boundary walls of the FPR 
were designed with no special consideration given to the possible explosion inside. Instead, 
the general practice of ship structural design in similar cases of withstanding vibration and 
machinery loads was followed. However, three enhanced designs were also investigated in 
the consequence analysis. 
Fig. 3 shows the conceptual fuel piping system devised for the case ship. The LNG supplied 
through the bunkering system is stored in the LNG storage tank from where two sets of 
submersible fuel supply pumps transfer the liquid fuel to FGSS in the FPR. Since IGF Code 
requires the machinery room WREH µJas-safe¶, where any single failure is not to lead to 
fire/explosion, the fuel pipes inside the machinery room are made fully double-walled. On 
WKHRWKHUKDQGLIWKHUHDUHWZRHQJLQHURRPVWKHVSDFHVDUHUHJDUGHGDVµ(6'-SURWHFWHG¶. 
In this case, if a gas leak is detected, the affected engine room is isolated by ESD system, 
leaving only the other one operational. For such arrangement double-walled pipes are not 
necessary. In addition, all confined spaces are fitted with exhaust type mechanical 
ventilation systems having a minimum capacity of 30 times per hour (IMO, 2017; ABS, 
2015). 
The concept design of the FGSS was conducted in accordance with the engine mDNHU¶V
specifications and the operational profile of the case ship, as these play a key role in 
determining the capacity of the FGSS, flow rate, pipe size, position, etc. The diameter of 
fuel supply line was determined to be 12.5 mm to meet the required fuel mass flow rate of 
2,727.69 kg/h for the main engine (MAN Diesel and Turbo). It is to be noted, however, that 
the pipes of the FGSS are not double walled. 
Detailed piping of the FGSS is given in Fig. 4 and the specifications are summarised in 
Table 2. The FGSS for the main engine consists of a suction drum, HP pumps and a 
vaporizer. On the other hand, the FGSS for generator engines and auxiliary boiler has a 
boil-off gas (BOG) heater and compressors in order to adjust the temperature and pressure 
of the gas fed from the tank before being fed to the combustion systems (MAN Diesel and 
Turbo, 2013). 
The phase and condition of the fuel vary throughout this process, and, as a result, same size 
leak holes can cause different leak rates depending on their locations. In view of this, the 
FGSS for the main engine was grouped into three sections: low pressure liquid (LPL), high 
pressure liquid (HPL) and high pressure vapour (HPV) sections. The FGSS for generator 
engines and auxiliary boiler was classified as low pressure vapour (LPV). The working 
pressure used in this study was 5 bars for low-pressure sections and 300 bars for high-
pressure sections. The temperature of liquid section is 112K while vapour section is 318K 
(Republic of Korea, 2014). 
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3.2  Scenario Analysis 
The final outcome of a fuel leak can be diverse, depending on the nature of the leak and 
functioning of the safety systems. The IGF Code has a mandatory requirement for all FPRs 
to be equipped with a gas detecting system. In addition, an exhuast type mechnical 
ventilation system with the capacity of 30 times air change each hour is required to 
continuously blow the flammable gases out of the space (IMO, 2017; ABS, 2015). 
Although all fuel leak may not necessarily lead to a damaging outcome as long as both 
safety systems function effectively. However, there is a probability of the safety systems 
malfunctioning. The paths from an initial fuel leak to various final outcomes were identified 
as shown in an event tree presented in Fig. 5. 
From this analysis the types of potential damaging outcomes were identified as fire and 
explosion. Asphyxiation is another accident outcome, but this was ignored, as it requires 
presence of a person in the FPR, which is unlikely as the FGSS is remotely controlled and 
a duty engineer is not normally exposed to a leak event in the room directly. 
The gas detector triggers the alarm at 20 % of low explosive level (LEL) of fuel-air mixture, 
and activate the fuel change-over at 40 % of LEL, shutting down the gas inlet by activating 
the automatic cut-off valve fitted to the outside of the room and effecting change-over of 
the fuel system. Therefore, a failure of the gas detector can increase the fuel content in the 
room to higher than the LEL, leading to a late isolated sceanrio. On the other hand, even 
when the ventilation is working effectively, a high enough leak rate can lead to explosion 
scenarios (IMO, 2017). 
 
 
3.3  Frequency Analysis 
In this step the frequency of initial leak, probability of safety system failures and probability 
of immediate/delayed ignition are estimated. 
3.3.1 Initial Leak Frequency 
Since the FGSS is not categorized as a seriously risky section and consequently the pipes 
are not made double walled, the likelihood of initial leak from the pipes is much higher 
than in the engine room. The frequency of an initial leak from each equipment described in 
the conceptual design of FGSS was analysed with respect to three different leak hole sizes: 
3mm, 10mm and full (12.5mm) based on the DNV Leak Frequency Datasheets (DNV, 
2012), and the results are summarised in Table 3. 
3.3.2 Probability of Full Leak/Ventilation Failure 
The probability of full leak scenario identified in the ETA is related to the failure of both 
manual and automatic isolation. The failure of manual isolation is caused by the failure of 
the gas detector or the alarm system, or the operator not taking or being able to take 
appropriate action when the alarm sounds, and this leads to the cut-off valve failing to close 
in time. Where automatic isolation is used, a failure of either leak detector or cut-off valve 
leads to the failure of the automatic shut-down. In both cases of failure the isolation of the 
leak is at least prolonged possibly for some time. Since there is no duty engineer constantly 
present, it is reseaonable to assume that the initial leak is to be detected by a gas detector 
rather than by a crew member. 
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The leaked liquid or gas fuel from a part of the FGSS may vaporize, disperse and be 
accumulated in the room. The proper operation of the ventilation system can remove the 
fuel gas from the room or at least reduce the concentration level in the room. A failure of 
the ventilation system at the time of a leak will make this safety device useless.  
 
The probability of safety system failure are obtained from various sources as showin in 
Table 4. The failure rate per year, Ȝ, was calculated from the upper failure rates shown in 
the references given in the table. The reliability of each equipment is then estimated using 
Eq. (2) (Ramiro, 1998). 
-ȜWR(t)=e     (2) 
 
Using the reliability data, a fault tree analysis was carried out, as shown in Figs 6 and 7. 
The result showed that the probability leading to full leak scenario was 0.113 while that of 
ventilation failure was 0.00126. 
 
3.3.3 Probability of Immediate Ignition and Delayed Ignition 
Several models have been developed by the chemical industry to estimate the probability 
of ignition, but this study adopts DNV model (DNV, 2013) for the probability of immediate 
ignition as shown in Table 5 as it is widely applied to cases of oil and gas leak. 
On the other hand, based on the available OGP models, the "UKOOA - Scenario 22 
2IIVKRUH3URFHVV*DV&RQJHVWHGRU0HFKDQLFDO9HQWHG0RGXOH´PRGHOZDVFRQVLGHUHGWR
be best suited for LNG leak in FPR in consideration of the propagation of released LNG in 
a confined space fitted with mechanical ventilation. Table 6 illustrates this model. 
Since the probabilities of immediate ignition and delayed ignition are considered to be 
functions of the leak rate (kg/s), it is necessary to estimate the leak rate of each scenario. 
For the liquid leak model, the initial leak rate of LNG can be obtained by Eq. (3) (Crowl, 
1990; John, 2010). 
LR L L L s aQ =C A 2ȡ (P -P )                  (3) 
 
 
 
For the gas leak model, Eq. (4) defines the pressure Pa. If the ratio of atmospheric pressure 
to the pipe pressure is greater than the ratio determined by Eq. (4), the flow can be classified 
as sonic (DNV, 2012). 
Ȗ
Ȗa
CR
s
P 2
( ) =( )
P Ȗ                (4) 
 
 
Based on this, the gas leak model, Eq. (5), adopted semi-ideal gas flow through a 
convergence-divergence nozzle at sonic regime (DNV, 2012).  
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3.4  Consequence Analysis 
The impact of an explosion can damage the structure of the FPR in any direction possibly 
leading to subsequent spread of the accident to other compartments. As shown in Fig. 8, 
the adjoining spaces of the FPR are a ballast tank, LNG storage tank space, tank connection 
room, a void space and No.3 and No.5 cargo holds. Although any damage to all the 
adjoining spaces matters, the LNG fuel storage tank space directly below the FPR is 
particularly sensitive. Any breach of the storage tank can lead to a far more serious 
consequence. For this reason the consequence anlysis of this study was focussed on the 
explosion impact on the bottom wall structure only. 
3.4.1 Impact of Overpressure 
In order to predict the impact of explosion under the condition of complete combustion, 
this study employed STAR-CCM+, a CFD Code, using the premixed eddy break-up (PEBU) 
model which solves individual transport equations for mean species on the computational 
grid, tracking a fuel mass fraction on the grid through the equations. The mean species 
concentrations are obtained as functions of the mean fuel mass fraction and a one-step 
global reaction scheme, which is internally calculated based on the unburnt gas 
composition (CD-adapco, 2014). Since the flow is expected to be turbulent, it uses the 
Reynolds-averaged Navier-Stokes function with the k- H turbulence model which is 
compatible with the combustion model (Republic of Korea, 2014). 
A series of test simulations was carried out to validate this explosion model. The 
benchmark used was the results of explosion simulations using FLACS described in an 
information document submitted to the CCC Sub-committee of IMO (Republic of Korea, 
2014). With a gas leak of 5.353 kg the FLACS simulations predicted a maximum 
overpressure of 0.27 bars to the nearest wall at 0.75 m distance from the ignition point, and 
3.7 bars for a 41.0 kg leak. For the test simulations with STAR-CCM+ the geometry of the 
FPR was built with a transverse 2D axisymmetric formulation. Mass ratios of fuel/air 
mixture equivalent to the condition used in the FLACS simulations were used. The results 
of 2D simulations were very close to the FLACS results with deviations of just over 10 % 
for 5.353 kg leak and less than 0.3 % for 41.0 kg leak as summarised in Table 7. 
Fig. 9 shows a 3D model of the conceptual FPR created in SolidWorks, a 3D modelling 
software, which was then transformed into a 2D axisymmetric model for CFD simulations 
as illustrated in Fig. 10 and Table 8. 
Since the explosion takes place within a very short time period, the leak of the fuel during 
the process of explosion was ignored. The initial atmospheric pressure and temperature of 
the FPR were assumed to be 101.3 kPa and 293 K, respectively, and it was also assumed 
that there was no initial movement of air in the room. In order to investigate the maximum 
damage of the bottom structure rather than the equipment in the room, the pipes and 
equipment were not modelled. Numerically, the blast wave is driven by the initial 
conditions defined in the ignition point at (0.0, 1.0), focusing on the magnitude of 
overpressure imposed on the bottom wall structure which forms a boundary with the LNG 
storage tank space. The explosion was modelled as a complete combustion with the ideal 
stoichiometric fuel/air ratio equivelent to 1:17.3 in an attempt to investigate the maximum 
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impact of explosion (Versteeg, 2007). The maximum overpressure is observed on the 
bottom wall at every 0.5 m. For the simulation, an implicit unsteady model was adopted 
with a very small time step of 1E-7 and the second order accuracy was used for both space 
and time. 
 
3.4.2 Structural Analysis 
To assess the structural strength of the FPR with respect to the load produced by a gas 
explosion, ANSYS 15 was used. The floor of the FPR is a simple stiffened plate as shown 
in Fig. 11. The primary stiffeners are transverse girders at 3,400 mm spacing and the deck 
longitudinals are spaced at 750 mm. 
In order to identify the minimum scantlings which can withstand the explosion load 
obtained from the simulation four different cases were studied using various sizes of 
primary supporting members, secondary members and the thickness of the base plate. 
These cases are summarised in Table 9. The girders were designed according to general 
shipyard practices, where the depth of the web is usually made three times the width of the 
face plate. It was assumed that all the structural members are made of normal structural 
steel, as defined by classification rules (DNV, 2015), with the yield strength of 235 N/mm2. 
An example modelling of Case 1 is shown in Fig. 12. For the FE analysis, the mesh size 
was kept at 50 mm throughout. 
 
4. Results (Risk Assessment) 
4.1  Results of Frequency Analysis 
From the frequency analysis using the ETA, the frequency of potential explosion for each 
case was estimated as shown in Table 10. The overall frequency of explosion is obtained 
by summing all the cases as illustrated in an FTA of Fig. 13. 
The minimum leak rate which can lead to the fuel-air mixture equivalent to the LEL for the 
given size of the room and the ventilation devices was identified through a simple 
ventilation simulation (see Appendix 1 for details). From this study it was determined that 
the explosion scenarios associated with 3 mm and 10 mm leak in LPV section, where leak 
rate is less than 0.07 kg/s, has little possibility of explosion as long as the ventilation system 
is effectively working. Therefore, the explosion frequencies associated with these scenarios 
were set to nil. The overall frequency of explosion was estimated to be 3.13E-4 /year. 
Since there are no explicit guidelines for regulating risk levels for LNG-fuelled ships, the 
impairment frequency limit of 1.00E-4 /year suggested by NORSOKZ-013 was used to 
judge the acceptability of the explosion frequency (NORSOK, 2001). It is clear that the 
overall frequency exceeds this limit by a large margin, and the cases associated with the 
HPL section contributes to this frequency the most. 
 
4.2  Results of Consequence Analysis 
The spread of overpressure as the explosion progresses can be observed in the flame 
contours of Fig. 14. The result of the simulation found that the pressure at the ignition point 
immediately after ignition was 8.4 bars. 
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The maximum overpressure on the floor at various transverse distances away from the 
ignition point obtained from the explosion simulation is summarised in Fig. 15. It can be 
seen that the maximum overpressure at the centre of the floor is 291 kPa and it decreases 
as it proceeds away from the centre. 
Accordingly the pressure load as shown in Fig. 16 was applied in the structural analysis: 
291 KPa from the centre to the 0.5m radius, 239 KPa between 0.5 m and 1.0 m radius, 166 
KPa between 1.0 m and 1.5 m radius, 135 KPa between 1.5 m and 2.0 m radius, 96 KPa 
between 2.0 m and 2.5 m radius and 73 KPa between 2.5 m and 3.0 m radius. 
The results of the FEA are presented in Figs 17 - 19 in the form of shear stress, bending 
stress and equivalent stress for the four cases. 
The maximum stresses to be experienced by the floor of the FPR in the event of an 
explosion are compared with the allowable stresses specified by the DNV GL Rule (DNV, 
2015) as shown in Table 11. It can be seen that all but Case 4 with the highest scantlings 
fails. This demonstrates that the boundary walls of the FPR must be strengthened 
considerably if the effects of any potential explosion are to be contained within it. 
 
5. Sensitivity Analysis 
This study chose an arbitary ignition point to investigate the risk of FPR associated with 
explosion. Given the fact that the explosion impact much depends on the distance from the 
ignition point, this generic approach may cause some uncertainties in the results of 
consequence in a quantitative sense. In addition, the assumption of complete combustion 
may have resulted in overestimatation of explosion impact for some cases. In this context, 
a sensitivity analysis was carried out to study the impact for various points of ignition with 
several cases of methane compositions ± about 5 % (air-rich) shown in Eq. (6), 10 % (near 
complete combustion) and about 15 % (fuel-rich) vol/vol shown in Eq. (7) (Versteeg, 2007). 
The results are presented in Fig. 20. 
Using the results of CFD analysis associated with alternative explosion scenarios, FE 
analysis was carried out. The results are shown in Table 12 where the regions shaded with 
red refer to unacceptably high stresses. As expected, the closer the ignition point from the 
floor, the higher the stress on the bottom structure of FPR was. The near-perfect combustion 
condition (about 10 % of methane-air ratio) led to higher impact of explosion. In addition, 
the fuel-rich condition (about 15 % of methane-air ratio) tended to have higher 
consequences than the fuel-scarce conditoin (about 5 % of matane-air ratio). 
 
CH4 + 2.1×2(O2+3.79N2) Î CO2 +2H2O +2.2O2 +15.92N2 (6) 
CH4 + 0.7×2(O2+3.79N2) Î CO2 +0.8H2O +1.2H2 +5.306N2 (7) 
 
The results of this sensitivity study indicate that the these parameters significanlty affect 
the impact of potential explosion, implying that the impact of explosion can be mitigated 
by controlling ignition points and methane-air ratio.  
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6. Discussion 
It was decided from the outset of this study that the results should be applicable to a wide 
variety of situations and consequently the analyses were conducted on imaginary ships and 
systems. It was then decided to create a conceptual design of FGSS and use it as the main 
subject of the study. However, it is quite possible that the leak frquency may have been 
underestimated because of this, since there will be many more components (e.g. pipes, 
valves, gauges and so on) in a real FGSS. Nevertheless, similar studies on existing ships 
and systems can easily be carried out following a similar approach. 
For explosion simulations, all obstacles (e.g., heater, pipe, et al) in the room were omitted 
in the numerical models. In fact, obstacles may play an important role in the overpressure 
profiles. However, the present study rather set out to enhance the generic understanding of 
risks associated with this relatively new process and to determine the adequacy of the 
current provisions in this regard, particularly in determining the safety levels of high 
pressure FPRs. In real situations, different ships have different arrangements of fuel gas 
supply systems fitted to FPRs and it is difficult to generalise them in a study such as ours. 
Moreover, specification of these location-specific parameters, being regarded as subjective 
variables, is not possible in rules and standards which have to cater for all kinds of situations. 
In this regard, it was more desirable to take the generic assumption of unrestricted spaces 
as these will produce more conservative results. On the other hand, as a recommendation 
for future studies where more specific analysis is required, it will be necessary to conduct 
case-by-case simulation with actual fuel-air ratio in the subject room by predicting exact 
leak duration and ignition timing for each case. 
In general, the methane content in LNG is about 87%~99% depending on the geographical 
location of production and the processing methods used. The LNG used in this study was 
assumed to be pure methane, and this will have introduced slight uncertainty in the results. 
However, the pure methane case was chosen as the representative case, as it was important 
for this study to address general situations. In any case the level of this uncertainty cannot 
be high enough to impair the general conclusions derived from the study and our 
understanding gained from it. Nevertheless, the sensitivity of LNG compositions on 
explosion impact needs to be investigated more thoroughly in the future. 
A physical explosion due to fast vaporization of a liquid leak could be an additional type 
of incidents leading to structural damage. One may argue that the risk of this type of 
incident must also be considered to make the analysis more realistic. However, given the 
fact that the physical explosion is more likely to occur in large quantity leaks, it is thought 
that the governing accident would be vapour cloud explosions rather than physical ones, as 
the FGSS considered here is relatively small with the diameter of the piping system only 
12.5 mm. 
The hazards caused by the leak or spill of LNG on board a ship are many, including various 
forms of fire, explosion and cryogenic harm. The FPRs are always unmanned during 
operation and the risk to human life from cryogenic burns and fire can, therefore, be ruled 
out. Cryogenic embrittlement of structural materials and fires can cause local problems, but 
compared to potential damage to human life and the vessel caused by explosions, these are 
minor. Consequently this study concentrated on explosions. In addition, the effects of 
various fire accidents and corresponding heat radiation on structure strength are relatively 
minor compare to the explosion impact and these type of accidents are more likely to be 
suppressed by fix fire extinguishing systems fitted to FRP before the strucrual damage 
becomes severe. As an evidence, the IGF Code 4.3 (IMO, 2017) stresses on the limitation 
of explosion consequences only for in the confined spaces. 
13 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper set out to investigate if the current rules, guidelines and design practices of LNG 
fuelled ships are adequate. In the process and an exemplary practical procedure to 
investigating the explosion risk of high pressure FPR was developed and demonstrated by 
studying the safety of FPRs of a case ship having high pressure FGSS. Results of the risk 
analysis show that both frequency and consequence of potential explosion are unacceptably 
high. The findings from the study suggests that FPRs are subject to unacceptably high 
probability (3.13E-04 per year) of explosion. The consequence analysis revealed that the 
impact of explosion is severe enough to jeopardise the integrity of the boundary wall 
structure. From this it can be concluded that  the risk is unacceptably high, and thus 
obviating the necessity for the procedure to evaluate the risk combining the probability and 
the severity. 
Unacceptably high levels of both frequency and consequence of the potential explosion 
suggest that, at least, either the probability of occurrence of potential explosion is to be 
reduced by enhancing safety measures in FPR or the structural designs of an FPR is to be 
substantially enhanced. 
Given the fact that the current IGF Code does not specify any safety requirement against 
the risk of explosion in an LNG-fuelled ship causing damage to other spaces in the ship, it 
is, therefore, thought that the current study can become a basis for a template for this type 
of risk analysis, showing that Case 4 with the highest scantlings can be sustainable against 
the potential impact of explosion. 
However, the sensitivity analysis showed that the ignition point and fuel composion  
significantly influence the degree of explosion impact on the structures, which implies that 
controlling of ignition points and fuel-air ratio can be a good safety means to mitigate the 
impact of explosion. 
Lastly, it may be right to point out that the present paper set out to show the gaps in the 
current regulatory provisions, especially with regard to addressing the neccessity of higher 
safety level for high-pressure FPRs. It is believed this study has achieved this, or at least 
made a start on it. Theferefore, it is expected that this work will be of some interest to the 
rule- and standard-makers who may well believe that developing more explicit and 
quantified guidelines is an urgent task. 
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Appendix I 
To identify the minimum leak rate which can lead to LEL of fuel-air mixture, a simple 
ventilation analysis was conducted by using STAR-CCM+. Under effective ventilation 
condition with capacity of 2.57 kg/s equivalent to 30 times air change each hour for the 
FPR (17m x 6m x 2.5m), it was found that the continuous leak with 0.07 kg/s converged to 
the volume fraction of CH4 of 5% (same as methane LEL) as shown in Figs A_1 and A_2. 
Therefore, the probability of explosion for small leak rate of less than 0.07 kg/s was ignored. 
In order to verify the mesh independence in the explosion analysis, a mesh convergence 
test was conducted with three different base mesh sets (0.02m, 0.015m and 0.01m). Fig. 
A_3 shows the result. It can be seen that the finer two mesh systems produce more or less 
identical results with deviations well within the acceptable level. 
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Fig. 1 Proposed risk assessment procedure for FPR. 
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Fig. 2 A proposed general arrangement of the LNG fuel system. 
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Fig. 3 Concept piping diagram of the fuel system. 
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Fig. 4 Concept design of the FGSS for the case ship. 
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Fig. 5 The event tree. 
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Fig. 6 FTA for delayed isolation. 
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Fig. 7 FTA for ventilation failure. 
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Fig. 8 Possible directions of explosion impact. 
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Fig. 9 A 3D model of the FPR 
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Fig. 10 A 2D Model of the FPR. 
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Fig. 11 Details of the FPR floor structure. 
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Fig. 12 The stiffened bottom panel of the FPR for Case 1. 
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Fig. 13 FTA showing the overall frequency of explosion. 
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Fig. 14 Progress of explosion. 
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Fig. 15 Maximum pressure on the floor at various distances from the ignition point. 
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Fig. 16 Pressure load applied in FE analysis. 
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Fig. 17 Shear stress on the floor: (a) Case 1; (b) Case 2; (c) Case 3; (d) Case 4. 
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Fig. 18 Bending stress on the floor: (a) Case 1; (b) Case 2; (c) Case 3; (d) Case 4. 
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Fig. 19 Equivalent stress on the floor: (a) Case 1; (b) Case 2; (c) Case 3; (d) Case 4. 
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Fig. 20 Maximum pressure on the floor at various distances from the ignition points and methane compositions. 
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Fig. A_1 Ventilation analysis of FPR at 0.07 kg/s leak. 
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Fig. A_2 Mass fraction of CH4 over time at 0.07 kg/s leak. 
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Fig. A_3 Mesh convergence test. 
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Table 1 General specifications of the case ship (Korean Register, 2015). 
Items Specifications 
L x B x D 328.0 m x 55.0 m x 29.0 m 
Main Engine Hyundai MAN B&W 6G80ME-C9 (before retrofit) 
MCR/NCR 20,680 kW x 65.8 rpm/17,578 kW x 62.3 rpm 
Speed 14.6 knots at sea trial 
F.O. Consumption abt. 67 tons/day 
Cruising range abt. 25,000 miles per one voyage from Brazil to East Asia 
Cruising day 300 days per year at NCR 
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Table 2 Specifications of the FGSS. 
Items Specifications 
Mass flow rate for M/E 2,727.69 kg/h 
Diameter of fuel supply line 12.5 mm 
Working pressure LPL for 5 bar , HPL for 300 bar 
Working temperature Liquid for 112K, Gas for 318K 
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Table 3 Frequency of initial leak with respect to leak size. 
Section Equipment List 
No. of 
Equipment 
Frequency of Leak (/year) 
3mm leak 10mm leak Full leak 
LPL 
Actuated valves 4 2.19E-03 6.89E-04 3.12E-04 
Filters 2 3.71E-03 1.83E-03 1.50E-03 
Flange 12 4.38E-04 1.59E-04 1.52E-04 
Manual valves 2 1.06E-04 4.60E-05 3.04E-05 
Pipe 14 1.33E-02 4.69E-03 2.17E-03 
Suction drum 1 9.46E-04 5.49E-04 8.57E-04 
Small gauge 
fittings 
3 9.32E-04 4.08E-04 2.59E-04 
Total 2.16E-02 8.37E-03 5.28E-03 
HPL 
Actuate valves 2 1.10E-03 3.45E-04 1.56E-04 
HP pumps 2 7.37E-02 3.02E-02 1.66E-02 
Flange 6 2.19E-04 7.96E-05 7.61E-05 
Pipe 3 2.85E-03 1.00E-03 4.65E-04 
Small gauge 
fittings 
3 9.32E-04 4.08E-04 2.59E-04 
Total 7.88E-02 3.21E-02 1.76E-02 
HPV 
Actuate valves 1 5.48E-04 1.72E-04 7.80E-05 
Flange 6 2.19E-04 7.96E-05 7.61E-05 
Heater 1 1.64E-03 7.71E-04 6.26E-04 
Pipe 3 2.85E-03 1.00E-03 4.65E-04 
Small gauge 
fittings 
1 3.11E-04 1.36E-04 8.64E-05 
Total 5.56E-03 2.16E-03 1.33E-03 
LPV 
Actuated valves 4 2.19E-03 6.89E-04 3.12E-04 
BOG compressor 2 7.37E-02 3.02E-02 1.66E-02 
Flange 16 5.85E-04 2.12E-04 2.03E-04 
Heater 1 1.64E-03 7.71E-04 6.26E-04 
Manual valves 4 2.11E-04 9.20E-05 6.09E-05 
Pipe 20 1.90E-02 6.69E-03 3.10E-03 
Small gauge 
fittings 
4 1.24E-03 5.43E-04 3.45E-04 
Total 9.85E-02 3.92E-02 2.13E-02 
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Table 4 Reliability data for safety systems. 
(ORADA, 2009; EPRI, 1995; Kletz, 1991; CCPS, 1989) 
 Safety System 
List 
Ȝ Reliability R(t) 
Unreliability 
(1-R(t)) 
1 Gas detector 3.67E-01 0.6930 0.3070 
2 Alarm 2.50E-04 0.99975 0.00025 
3 
Operator to obey 
alarm 
- 0.97 0.03 
4 Cut-off V/V 1.86E-02 0.9816 0.0184 
5 Motor-driven fan 2.16E-01 0.805 0.195 
6 
Change-over 
system 
6.50E-03 0.99352 0.00648 
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Table 5 Probability of immediate ignition (DNV, 2013). 
Leak Rate (kg/s) Probability of  
Immediate Ignition Gas Liquid 
<1 <1.2 0.0001 
1-10 1.2-25 0.001 
>10 >25 0.01 
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Table 6 Probability of delayed ignition (OGP, 2010). 
Delayed Ignition Probability 
Leak 
Rate(kg/s) 
Ignition 
Probability 
1.00E-01 1.00E-03 
2.00E-01 2.30E-03 
5.00E-01 6.60E-03 
1.00E+00 1.50E-02 
2.00E+00 1.74E-02 
5.00E+00 2.13E-02 
1.00E+01 2.47E-02 
2.00E+01 2.87E-02 
5.00E+01 3.50E-02 
1.00E+02 4.00E-02 
2.00E+02 4.00E-02 
5.00E+02 4.00E-02 
1.00E+03 4.00E-02 
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Table 7  Model verification tests 
Case 
Scenario Max. pressure 
Deviation Leak 
Quantity 
Mass 
Ratio 
Fuel/Air 
FLACS 
(Republic of 
Korea, 2014) 
STAR-CCM+ 
Case 1 5.353 kg 1:32.3 0.27 Bar 0.3Bar 0.03 Bar 
Case 2 41.0 kg 1:4 3.7 Bar 3.71Bar 0.01 Bar 
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Table 8 CFD simulation conditions. 
Parameters Value 
2D Geometry 3.0m x 2.5m 
Number of mesh cells 75,294 
Initial temperature 293K 
Initial pressure 101.3 kPa 
Mass fractions of CH4, O2, N2 
(fuel-air ratio by mass 1:17.3) 
0.0545, 0.2203, 0.7252 
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Table 9 Stiffened designs for each case. 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Primary 
supporting 
member 
500x12+100x15 (T) 3 700x12+100x15 (T) 900x15+200x18 (T) 1,100x15+200x18 (T) 
Secondary 
member 
100x75x10/14 A 4 200x90x10/14 A 300x90x11/16 A 400x100x13/18 A 
Thickness of base 
plate 
10 mm 12 mm 14 mm 16 mm 
Total number of 
elements 
(for simulation) 
56,080 62,760 68,760 77,080 
 
 
  
                                                          
3 (web depth x web thickness + face plate breadth x face plate thickness) 
4 (web depth x flange breadth x web thickness/flange thickness) 
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Table 10 Result of ETA for various cases. 
Section 
Case 
(Hole 
Size) 
Leak 
Rate 
(kg/s) 
Initial 
Freq. 
(/year) 
Imm. 
Ignition 
Leak Duration  
(Full Leak) 
Ventilation 
System 
Del. Ignition 
Accident 
Freq. 
(/year) 
Accident 
Type 
LPL 
Section 
Case1_1  
(3mm 
Leak) 
0.0888 
2.16E-
02 
0.0001 - - 
- - 
2.16E-06 Pool Fire 
0.9999 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 1.92E-02 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.001 2.42E-08 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 2.42E-05 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.001 2.37E-06 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 2.37E-03 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.001 2.99E-09 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 2.98E-06 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
Case1_2  
(10mm 
Leak) 
0.9870 
8.37E-
03 
0.0001 - - 
- - 
8.37E-07 Pool Fire 
0.9999 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 7.44E-03 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.015 1.41E-07 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.985 9.25E-06 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.015 1.38E-05 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.985 9.04E-04 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.015 1.74E-08 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.985 1.14E-06 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
Case1_3 
(Full 
Leak) 
1.54 
5.28E-
03 
0.0010 - - 
- - 
5.28E-06 Pool Fire 
0.9990 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 4.69E-03 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0174 1.03E-07 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.9826 5.82E-06 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0174 1.01E-05 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9826 5.68E-04 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0174 1.27E-08 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9826 7.17E-07 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
HPL 
Section 
Case2_1  
(3mm 
Leak) 
0.6890 
7.88E-
02 
0.0001 - - 
- - 
7.88E-06 Pool Fire 
0.9999 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 7.01E-02 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0150 1.33E-06 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.985 8.71E-05 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.015 1.30E-04 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.985 8.51E-03 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.015 1.63E-07 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.985 1.07E-05 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
Case2_2  
(10mm 
Leak) 
7.6600 
3.21E-
02 
0.0010 - - 
- - 
3.21E-05 Pool Fire 
0.9990 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 2.85E-02 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0247 8.88E-07 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.9753 3.51E-05 
Gas 
Dispersion 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0247 8.68E-05 Explosion 
50 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
No 
Ignition 
0.9753 3.43E-03 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0247 1.09E-07 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9753 4.32E-06 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
Case2_3 
(Full 
Leak) 
12.00 
1.76E-
02 
0.0010 - - 
- - 
1.76E-05 Pool Fire 
0.9990 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 1.56E-02 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0287 5.66E-07 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.9713 1.92E-05 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0287 5.53E-05 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9713 1.87E-03 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0287 6.98E-08 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9713 2.36E-06 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
HPV 
Section 
Case3_1  
(3mm 
Leak) 
0.3290 
5.56E-
03 
0.0001 - - 
- - 
5.56E-07 Jet Fire 
0.9999 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 4.95E-03 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0066 4.12E-08 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.9934 6.20E-06 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0066 4.02E-06 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9934 6.06E-04 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0066 5.08E-09 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9934 7.64E-07 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
Case3_2  
(10mm 
Leak) 
3.6500 
2.16E-
03 
0.0010 - - 
- - 
2.16E-06 Jet Fire 
0.9990 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 1.92E-03 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0213 5.16E-08 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.9787 2.37E-06 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0213 5.04E-06 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9787 2.32E-04 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0213 6.37E-09 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9787 2.93E-07 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
Case3_3 
(Full 
Leak) 
5.70 
1.33E-
03 
0.0010 - - 
- - 
1.33E-06 Jet Fire 
0.9990 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 1.18E-03 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0247 3.69E-08 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.9753 1.46E-06 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0247 3.60E-06 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9753 1.42E-04 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0247 4.55E-09 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.9753 1.80E-07 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
LPV 
Section 
Case4_1  
(3mm 
Leak) 
0.0055 
9.85E-
02 
0.0001 - - 
- - 
9.85E-06 Jet Fire 
0.9999 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 8.76E-02 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0010 1.11E-07 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 1.10E-04 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.001 1.08E-05 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 1.08E-02 
Gas 
Dispersion 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.001 1.36E-08 Explosion 
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No 
Eff. 
Vent 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 1.36E-05 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
Case4_2  
(10mm 
Leak) 
0.0606 
3.92E-
02 
0.0001 - - 
- - 
3.92E-06 Jet Fire 
0.9999 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 3.49E-02 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0010 4.40E-08 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 4.40E-05 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.001 4.30E-06 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 4.30E-03 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.001 5.43E-09 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 5.42E-06 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
Case4_3 
(Full 
Leak) 
5.70 
2.13E-
02 
0.0001 - - 
- - 
2.13E-06 Jet Fire 
0.9999 
Limited 
Leak 
0.8902 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 1.89E-02 
No 
ignition 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.0010 2.39E-08 
Flash/pool 
Fire 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 2.39E-05 
Gas 
Dispersion 
Late 
Isolated 
Leak 
0.1098 
Eff. 
Vent. 
0.9987 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.001 2.33E-06 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 2.33E-03 
Gas 
Dispersion 
No 
Eff. 
Vent 
0.0013 
Delayed 
Ig. 
0.001 2.95E-09 Explosion 
No 
Ignition 
0.999 2.94E-06 
Flammable 
gas 
confined 
Sum of Explosion Freq. 3.13E-04 /year 
 
  
52 
 
 
Table 11 Summary of stresses for various scantlings. 
Type of 
Stress 
Allowable 
Stress 
(N/mm2) 
Maximum Actual Stress (N/mm2) 
Case1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Shear stress 90.0 259.7 137.5 89.6 58.6 
Bending stress 160.0 1170.0 440.1 243.2 143.1 
Equivalent 
stress 
245.0 1250.0 505.1 283.6 213.4 
 
  
53 
 
Table 12 Summary of stresses associated with alternative scenarios for various scantlings. 
Stress Type 
Allowab
le Stress 
(N/mm2) 
Methan
e-Air 
Ratio 
Ignition Point 
(vertical 
distance from 
floor) 
Maximum Actual Stress (N/mm2) 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Shear Stress 90 
5% 
0.7 m 214.2 120.8 80.6 57.6 
0.9 m 174.4 97.1 64.6 46.1 
1 m 156.8 87.1 57.9 41.3 
10% 
0.7 m 339.3 194.9 130.6 93.9 
0.9 m 267.6 150.9 100.6 72.0 
1 m 259.7 137.5 89.6 58.6 
15% 
0.7 m 326.2 186.9 125.1 90.0 
0.9 m 259.7 146.3 97.5 69.8 
1 m 230.7 129.3 86.1 61.6 
Bending 
Stress 
160 
5% 
0.7 m 1000.0 376.0 213.8 141.9 
0.9 m 785.2 292.7 167.3 111.0 
1 m 695.6 259.7 149.1 98.9 
10% 
0.7 m 1680.0 634.5 360.9 239.7 
0.9 m 1250.0 468.9 267.1 177.2 
1 m 1170.0 440.1 243.2 143.1 
15% 
0.7 m 1600.0 605.0 344.1 288.5 
0.9 m 1121.0 453.6 258.4 171.5 
1 m 1060.0 395.1 225.9 149.8 
Equivalent 
Stress 
245 
5% 
0.7 m 1070.0 400.5 227.7 200.0 
0.9 m 833.1 376.1 213.7 151.5 
1 m 738.1 361.2 205.3 134.3 
10% 
0.7 m 1780.0 666.6 373.0 352.9 
0.9 m 1330.0 517.8 294.3 248.9 
1 m 1250.0 505.1 283.6 213.4 
15% 
0.7 m 1700.0 635.6 355.5 334.5 
0.9 m 1129.0 507.2 288.3 240.4 
1 m 1120.0 485.5 275.9 207.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
